

Copy 2 of 4
Pages series B

COPY

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
SUB-REGION MARSBURG
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS REGION III

APG 872

FILE: III-M-2005

22 July 1948

SUBJECT: Gunter d'ALQUEM

Re: Personnel

Gross Reference: Informants

PERSONALITY REPORT

1. FULL NAME (WITH ALIASES):

Gunter d'ALQUEM

2. IDENTITY DOCUMENTS:

British Prisoner of War Discharge document

3. PRESENT ADDRESS OR POSSIBLE WHEREABOUTS:

Resides at present in KRSBACH (150/W91), IK KRSBACH. As long as SUBJECT resides in KRSBACH, his whereabouts will be known to Captain DELOACH, the Kreis KRSBACH L&SO Officer.

4. FORMER ADDRESSES:

ESSEN, (152/Al1)
MARBURG, (151/074), University of MARBURG
BREMEN, (154/W79)

5. PERSONAL DATA:

SEX: Male; HEIGHT: Five feet, nine inches (5'9"); WEIGHT: One hundred and fifty (150) U.S. pounds; EYES: Blue, large; HAIR: Medium blond, fine textured, graying slightly at temples; MARITAL STATUS: Married, three (3) children, two (2) sons and one (1) daughter; NATIONALITY: German; DATE OF BIRTH: 24 October 1910; BIRTHPLACE: ESSEN (152/Al1); CITIZENSHIP: German; OCCUPATION: As civilian, followed journalist trade; RELIGION: Belongs to no church; DISTINGUISHING CHARACTERISTICS: SUBJECT bears marked resemblance, especially in profile, to Richard DIX, U.S. film actor. SUBJECT has small hands and feet and in respect to the general proportion existing between torso length and leg length, SUBJECT has longer legs than average. SUBJECT has a deep voice with a wide range of voice inflection. SUBJECT is physically nervous and appears to be unable to remain for more than a few minutes in a given position. SUBJECT has a wide mouth with the labial surfaces

SECRET

COPY 2 OF 2 COPIES
attachment 1
51043

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2001 2006

FOR COORDINATION WITH US Army

SECRET

- 2 -

PERSONALITY REPORT, S/R MANNING, SUBJECT: Gunter d'ALQUEN, 22 July 1948 cont'd.

of upper and lower lips almost identical in conformation. SUBJECT has the habit of pursing lips and flexing jaw muscles when in thought.

6. POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS:

Past: Joined NSDAP in 1937; Present: None

7. SPOUSE: Margarita (Margarete) d'ALQUEN. Associate: Walter REIT, alias Walter SAUER, with whom SUBJECT remains in contact. REIT lives in ESBACH, (L50/M91), LK ESBACH.

8. PERSONAL HISTORY:

a. 1938: Travelled in Italy as civilian journalist with the purpose of studying Fascist organizations and Fascistic propaganda methods.

b. 1939: All of January and February spent in Spain. Applied for Wehrmacht Officers Reserve Corps early in 1939. During September and October was assigned as a special correspondent to HITLER's headquarters. In November 1939 began officer's training course with Leibstandarte in BERLIN, (M53/175). Enlisted in Waffen SS during December 1939.

c. 1940: Formed and led a company of war correspondents to be distributed among the Waffen SS divisions. In May 1940 was commander of this war correspondent company during the battle for France. During June and July 1940 SUBJECT was attached to the staff of Minister GOEBBELS as ordnance officer. As time progressed, the original company of war correspondents became more and more to be a unit concerned with propaganda and psychological warfare. SUBJECT, by HITLER's order, organized and trained nine (9) more companies, identical in organizational structure and purpose to the original company.

d. 1941: SUBJECT traveled in Spain. (Agent's notes: Though SUBJECT did not discuss his Spanish travels at length, from the general tenor of conversation the undersigned is of the opinion that SUBJECT was engaged in propaganda unit organization.) Upon completion of their training, the nine (9) war correspondent companies were organized into a battalion with SUBJECT in command. The companies of this battalion were widely dispersed over the various fronts and a coordinating headquarters was established for SUBJECT in BERLIN.

e. 1942: SUBJECT spent most of 1942 on the Eastern Front and had units under his command with the combat forces at points from Finland to

SECRET

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET

PERSONALITY REPORT, S/R MANSUNG, SUBJECT: Guntar d'ALQUEN, 22 July 1948
cont'd.

the Southern Front. During the year of 1942, SUBJECT's battalion became an independent unit and was administered to from BERLIN. SUBJECT made first contact with the Russian GENERAL, Vasili VLASSOV while VLASSOV was opposing the German advance before MAIKOP. VLASSOV was captured and SUBJECT began attempts to win VLASSOV to head a volunteer unit composed of German-held Russian PWs against the Russians. (Reference is made to Orientation and Guidance Report No 7, Headquarters 970th CIC Detachment, SUGCM, Section 6, Part 2, Page 64, Paragraph 229, dated 28 Feb 1948). SUBJECT suggested to HITLER that VLASSOV could be used since VLASSOV an Anti-Bolshevik was a Ukrainian nationalist, but HITLER forbade VLASSOV's use. SUBJECT continued cultivation of VLASSOV in secret.

f. 1943: SUBJECT was with combat troops during the battles of CHARKOV and LENINGRAD. The winter of 1943 was spent in studying the deterioration of morale among the Soviet troops. The use by SUBJECT's units of several thousands of German-held Russian PWs marked the beginning of what was, at that time, a new propaganda and psychological warfare approach. By HITLER's order, during 1943, SUBJECT's battalion became a regiment and was given the name "SS Standarte Kurt EGGER". At this time SUBJECT was appointed regimental commander with the rank of Colonel.

g. 1944: SUBJECT was assigned several small units from the Luftwaffe and the Wehrmacht, composed aggregately of approximately four thousand (4,000) officers and EM for work on an entirely new operation on the Southern Front. This operation, called "SKOPFION" was directed toward the morale of the Soviet troops opposing the German armies in the South Ukraine. Early 1944, marked the first officially admitted cooperation with VLASSOV and General SHILEIKOFF. In an interview with SUBJECT and VLASSOV, July 1944, HITLER gave collaboration orders and VLASSOV's authority was defined. At first one (1) division and later four (4) divisions, composed mostly of German-held and volunteering Ukrainians, were placed under VLASSOV's command. SUBJECT, in collaboration with VLASSOV, organized in VLASSOV's divisions several propaganda and psychological warfare units under the command of German officers. These units were subordinated to and equipped by "Standarte Kurt EGGER".

h. 1945: SUBJECT organized combat radio stations (Kampfender) whose purpose was to broadcast propaganda to enemy troops. A breach developed between SUBJECT and the ministry of propaganda during the last two (2) months of the war over SUBJECT's refusal to place the technical equipment of "Standarte Kurt EGGER" at the disposal of the Werewolf program. SUBJECT was appointed Chief of Wehrmacht Propaganda Troops in April 1945. Captured by British May 1945.

- End -

SECRET

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

U
O
P
I

SECRET

QUESTIONNAIRE

I. Statement of Conditions:

1. Eastern Germany is under occupational control of Soviet civilian and military personnel. It is believed that the Soviet occupation could be weakened if its personnel could be subjected to certain psychological warfare pressures, exerted (a) on them directly or (b) on them through the surrounding German population.

2. The basic difficulties in exerting psychological pressures on Russian civilian and military personnel in the East Zone appear to be:

a. The highly inaccessible position of such personnel due to strict censorship, non-fraternization regulations and other severe restrictions governing the conduct and movement of such personnel.

b. The operational problem of organizing agent networks in the East Zone for the purpose of distributing anti-Soviet propaganda.

II. Questions:

1. Bearing in mind the foregoing basic conditions, the following questions are submitted:

a. In your opinion, what psychological warfare measures and techniques could be applied today in harassing or undermining the morale of Soviet officials, officers and troops in the Soviet Zone of Germany?

b. How would you propose reaching such personnel with a specific piece of propaganda or message, bearing in mind the difficulty of contact or communication with them? Be specific as to methods to be employed.

c. How could propaganda pressure best be exerted upon Soviet personnel:

(1) By anti-Soviet propaganda prepared in German and addressed to the German population, the basic purpose being to increase German resistance to Soviet intimidation or domination?

(2) By propaganda prepared in Russian and delivered directly to Soviet personnel, the purpose being to adversely affect the morale of such personnel?

(3) By a combination of both methods?

SECRET

COPY 2 OF 2 COPIES

attachment 2

I 31043

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET

- 2 -

d. In general, what fundamental propaganda themes or motifs could be most effectively used in subversive anti-Soviet propaganda addressed to:

- (1) German population?
- (2) Soviet governmental officials and bureaucrats?
- (3) Soviet officers?
- (4) Soviet troops?

e. What operational implements would be used? Specifically, would you contemplate using radio, printed propaganda, rumor, poison pen letters, etc.?

f. Bearing in mind that the cite of any radio transmission from a fixed position can always be eventually detected by direction finding techniques, if the use of radio is contemplated, how, in your opinion, could such an operation be kept sufficiently concealed to prevent Soviet direction finders from pin pointing its location and exposing it?

g. Do you know any persons who might be qualified and available to carry on clandestine radio operations, both from a technical as well as an operational standpoint?

h. In order to develop an organization for the mailing of printed propaganda and propagation of rumors from at least six principal cities within the East Zone of Germany, what general type of organization would be required? Submit a general organization chart and plan of operation, including a general description of such physical requirements as transportation and other operational needs.

i. To what extent, in your opinion, would it be possible to organize the collection of slanderous or other compromising information concerning the private lives of Soviet officials and officers? How could such information, if obtained systematically, be effectively used?

j. Would you be willing—either directly or through persons recommended by you—to assist in psychological warfare operations against Soviet targets in the East Zone of Germany?

k. Assuming you would be interested in such activities, approximately how much time would be required to establish a single network for the dissemination of printed anti-Soviet propaganda in the Eastern Zone? In your opinion, what should be the character and size of such a single network and against what selected targets should it initially operate? In addition, what volume of propaganda material (in number of copies or weight) do you think such a network could handle, and how frequently could such material be distributed?

SECRET

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET
REPLY TO QUESTIONNAIRE

2 of 2 pages series 2

Unter d'ARQUEL

1. Statement of Conditions:

1. The introduction of several facts and opinions regarding conditions in the eastern zone which would effect the functioning and success of a psychological warfare campaign against eastern zone targets is considered necessary at the beginning of this report in order to provide starting points for their later detailed discussion. An enlargement upon the "Statement of Conditions" as given in the referenced letter is considered the simplest way to accomplish these introductions. This enlarged "Statement of Conditions" is as follows:

The Soviet occupation power in the eastern zone operates under conditions quite different from those experienced by any other occupation power in any other country. In furtherance of their usual political doctrine, the Soviets, after their occupation of the Eastern Zone, constructed there an addition to their already existing power instruments out of German elements. This situation is by no means comparable with the conditions in the Western Zones. Even if the Eastern German parties should be fully in accord with the political opinions of the occupation powers they would remain German parties. The SED is only a German party in name. Actually it is an instrument of the Russian occupation power. Superficially this would appear to mean a strengthening of the Russian position. Actually the SED is the weakest point in the Russian power-system. The zonal borders running through Germany are holes in the iron curtain which assist not only the Russians in their infiltration and penetration efforts in a westerly direction. These zonal borders are also inlets through which the west could gain access to the mechanism of the Soviet power. The Russians, who in nearly every other case command so well the art of locking up, have to depend upon, at this point, a mass organization recruited of German members. They have, whether they like it or not, a broad area of contact with the west which, too, is a broad entrance for incompatible ideological bacteria. This part of the Russian power system is a piece of cancerous tissue because the SED has to rely upon masses which, in the end, are ninety-five percent anti-Soviet in attitude. It would be a fundamental error not to see in this fact the deciding direction-indicator for any psychological warfare enterprise against targets in the Eastern Zone. Therefore, it would be an error in fundamentals to attempt to deal with the Soviet Occupation Power and the Eastern German population as separated complexes. In fact, the multiple overlapping of these complexes is the condition most vulnerable to propaganda action from the West. Until now the propaganda hole in the iron curtain has worked favorably for the Soviets. Since the SED does not speak formally in the Russian but in the German name, the opportunity presents itself to the Russians to stir the Germans in the East against the Western Occupation Powers without being forced to show their hand. Day after day this origin-distortion happens in innumerable radio transmissions. In this manner the KPD of the Western Zones is supplied with propaganda materials without having to reveal to the Western Occupation Powers that the Western KPD is really the Russians' trojan horse. But this and other

SECRET

COPY 2 OF 2 COPIES

attachment 3
2 31043

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET

methods does not change the fact that all these methods are only steps along diverse paths by a centrally directed anti-western propaganda. The Russian origin of this propaganda gives the United States the moral and political right to answer with similar methods in the same theater or this cold or nerve war. The fact that this propaganda of Russian origin is primarily directed at the Western Germans is incidental and the fact that no visible effect upon American Officers and Officials has been produced does not diminish the American moral right to retaliate against the Soviets' aborted and impracticable propaganda attempts and intentions. The propaganda's failure to produce a visible effect does not indicate a Russian restraint. They would if they could and their failure results from the fact that a people of a very high living standard is immune to propaganda made by people of a lower living standard. Even though no moral reasons exist to dissuade the Americans from attacking the Russians with the latter's own propaganda weapons in this cold war (even while the war was in progress the Russians organized a very lively spy activity even including their allies as targets), it would be more cunning to choose an approach which would not easily be detected and pin-pointed as an American action. The cue for choosing the form of approach should be taken from the special conditions prevailing in the Eastern Zone. After their whole mentality, experience and education, the Russians are engineers of organization and counter organization. One should attack them where the organization and the conceivable runs out into the unorganizable and the inconceivable. By covering the actual origin the political advantage would result that one could stop, disown and deny such an action at any time without damaging the American reputation.

- 2a. It is true that Russian personnel in the Eastern Zone is subject to strict censorship and other severe restrictions. But the situation caused by these impositions is not to be compared with the situation which would result in the Western Zones if such restrictions were imposed here. The American soldiers are mostly concentrated upon important places and are more or less independent in their living status. As a matter of fact they could exist with no contact at all with the German population. The Russian army personnel is distributed over the whole country down to the last little village. Russian personnel is interwoven into the economy apparatus. Russian personnel are working in the Soviet AGs (co-ops or trusts) and at the key points of the whole collecting and distributing system. The Russian principle of mistrust of everyone makes a clearly-bordered separation impossible. In addition, the German standard of living, even under today's austerity-enforcing conditions, presents a powerful attraction to the Russians. Therefore the contact between the population and the occupation personnel, in spite of the well-known restrictions in the Eastern Zone, is far more close than in the case in the West. Since the whole system is based upon using the SED, which is under Soviet control, to prolongate the occupation power's arm, this contact is not removable by even more severe restrictions. As long as the Russians insert themselves into all enterprises such as SED meetings, a strict and sharp separation

2

SECRET

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

of Germans and Russians cannot be made. This we see that the system which constructs its own government's party in an occupied country bears its weakness within itself. A psychological warfare campaign must use these weaknesses. A psychological warfare campaign need not use the difficult and complicated direct route to the occupation power. It must exploit the situation as given and use the route the Germans already have built to the Russians; except, of course, it must traverse this route in the opposite direction. By using this route an appeal would be made to the occupation power but this appeal would be a concomitant side-reaction.

20. The heaviest problem which would burden the operation of an agent network in the Eastern Zone is the unchallenged mastery of the Russians in this field. In the West there is no parallel to their counter intelligence system whose main instruments are stool pigeons and brutal annihilations. This preponderance of the Russians can only be counterbalanced by an enormous expenditure of material and organizational effort. Therefore, one asks if it would not be better to shelve this plan and find a better one. Actually this better plan is born out of the special conditions existing in the Eastern Zone. One can have a propaganda agent network in a foreign country where citizens and soldiers represent a homogeneous political will. In an occupied country the conditions are quite different. In an occupied country there is the fundamental acceptance of a latent opposition to the occupation power. In the Eastern Zone there is not only an occupation power but a foreign doctrine which causes hate because this doctrine uses German helpers and henchmen to further its purposes. An occupation is, of course, the logical consequence of a lost war. It is always considered burdensome and annoying but seldom is it really hated. The genuine hate is reserved for and is limited to the occupied country's indigenes who are willing to dominate and suppress their own people in the name of and under the commission of the occupying power. Because of this special brand of hate the latent opposition in the Eastern Zone is loaded with quite different tensions from those with which a latent opposition in the West ever could be. There should be basic differences between the forms of propaganda attempts to agitate the U.S. Zone Germans against the Americans and attempts to arouse the Eastern Zone Germans against their suppressors in the SED. Existing masses of opposition are present in the Eastern Zone and require only the proper means for activation. These masses are a closely-knit majority which does not require laborious persuasion. Since this mass mood already exists, it is believed that with a relatively small apparatus one could achieve results all out of proportion to those achieved from an artificial construction such as a network of agents. The Soviets are organizationally and psychologically prepared to counter such an organizationally conceivable apparatus as a network of agents. Anticipation of the counter and its form is the tactic which could be used to paralyze the counter's possibilities before its initiation. The Germans of the Eastern Zone are too exposed to physical pressure and reprisals to induce them into organized operation. One could not succeed and one should not attempt to do so. In a psychological warfare campaign against the Eastern Zone the clear oppositional attitude of the

SECRET

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET

population would be as a broad and natural current which automatically carries all things made to float in it to the target. In comparison to this broad current an agent network would be only a system of small water-courses. One certainly should lay the groundwork for such an agent organization in case this cold war should become warm. One needs a system of vantage points from which to gauge success or failure. But this is a necessity of the second phase and does not come into the sphere of psychological warfare. An agent network means a complicated, always endangered, untight, and almost inscurable organization. It is like a cannon which frequently explodes backward. After my experience I believe that it is possible to secure noteworthy results without the use of an agent network and using the manner already suggested with a handful of experts and a small amount of money. The preparedness of the Eastern Zone population to wage a psychological war against the Soviets and their henchmen exists and is so volatile that only a mild catalytic agent is required to loose its powers. The apparatus which could be built up would then only have to steer these powers and, if necessary, put on the brakes.

II. Agent's Forward:

Even without knowledge of the presuppositions, the EIs under paragraph II of the referenced letter indicate a certain direction clearly enough. Such a uniform complex of questions requires, of course, schematic but jointed answers. But the disposition of the constituent ideas in this report cannot be arranged diagrammatically. Since your EIs require answers encompassing organizational, technical and theoretical fields, all of which are overlapping, the answers to these EIs must overlap to preserve continuity and it is found impossible to follow the given scheme in forwarding the material contained herein except in a general manner. To assist the reader in finding his way back to the given scheme, reference indications to the concerned paragraph in the referenced letter are made and underlined at the margins.

1a. The Soviet propaganda is double-tracked. On the outside it is a missionary propaganda which appeals to the oppressed, misused by exploiters and warmongers. On the inside it is nationalistic and appeals to the man who has once defended his country against foreign aggressors and who, now for the second time, has to fight a similar danger. The Soviet human in the Eastern Zone stands under the influence of these nationalistic theses. These theses give him the assurance of the conqueror guarding his fatherland in a foreign country who must be prepared to advance even farther to the West in order to extirpate new dangers menacing his own country. The nationalistic aspect of this inside propaganda is so clearly defined that a member of the Russian occupation power (excluding political specialists) is never a political missionary. He never carries on political

SECRET

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET

discussions. He is always only the conqueror, the preserver of order, the enemy of all the enemies of Russia. The Soviet human in the Eastern Zone does not feel any longing for civil repose and peaceful work. His living conditions in Russia were not so good as to make him detest war and playing soldier. He makes a far better living in the army than he ever made in a factory and the horrors of war cannot appear worse to him than the horrors of his civilian everyday. Out of this situation negative perceptions result as follows:

He is immune to all attempts by the West to prove "the wrongs done by the Soviets".

The Russian member of the Eastern Zone occupation force is immunized against any sort of pacifistic or anti-war propaganda.

He is immunized against dialectic contradictions to Soviet propaganda theses.

His vulnerability lies in those instincts which the Soviet Nationalistic propaganda has loosed in him. It depresses him that as conqueror he has a lower standard of living than those whom he dominates. He sees the comfortable living standard of the SED functionaries as a German-induced effect. It depresses him that the hard working Eastern Zone industry produces products of a very high quality. It distresses him that the war, finally won after such terrible grievances, has not brought a better living to him and his relatives. He does not fear the new war but he fears that it will mean only a repetition of the hard work and still more austere living afterwards. Out of these impressions vulnerable points to psychological influence are as follows:

You are a brave soldier and you conquered this country but neither you or Russia has profited.

Many of the Germans which you dominate live far better than you and your family because they know better how to cooperate with your superiors. The wealth and the countries which you have conquered and will have to conquer will never yield any wealth to you and your folks. On the fires of your honorable nationalism very few are cooking their soup.

If you have to fight a new war, regardless of who starts it, you must see that this present situation is not repeated.

III.2.2. and 4: One should not make complicated differentiations between the needs of Soviet officials and bureaucrats and between Soviet officers and troops. The only difference is that some of these are confirmed bolsheviks and some are "mouth bolsheviks". Direct appeals to the former are in vain. One has to drive a wedge between these two types to discredit the genuine bolsheviks and render them suspect in the eyes of the others.

SECRET

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET

11.14a Before answering the question as to how to reach the Russian personnel by propaganda one should exclude the negative again; one must decide not to do that which it does not pay to do. To rule out the unprofitable one asks questions as follows:

Question: What technical and organization means appear inadequate?

Answer: Those members of the Soviet occupation power who live in German quarters and have continuous contact with Germans, in contrast to those troops living in barracks, have certain possibilities of listening to radio transmissions. They are, then, exposed to the transmissions of propaganda stations. As soon as the first effects of a Western propaganda transmission are ascertained the Soviet authorities would know how to end and would stop this listening. A direct appeal to the Russians will be possible only during the first broadcasts. Troops who are quartered together are not entirely naive in the face of propaganda since they, themselves, are organized into propaganda cells. A propaganda action with leaflets aimed at Russian troops has no chance of success. These methods proved successful in wartime where the front-line, base and partisan areas often overlapped, however, these methods are not valid in the siat-peace situation prevailing under an occupation. The very modest successes which one could gather at the beginning would not justify the difficult and expensive action.

Question: What sources of propaganda would arouse the special mistrust of the receiver?

Answer: The German who lost the war cannot speak to the Russian conqueror and still, at the same time, address his nationalistic emotions and sentiments. The Russian inferiority complex would be irritated by and would stall advances made by an American or any other Western "enemy". Against this inferiority complex the nicest and most logical proof of the decent intentions of the White House and the clearest unveiling of the Kremlin's criminality would come to naught. Politics aside, to the Russians, all people from the West are rich, well-fed and do not want the Russian to become, likewise, rich and satisfied. By discussing the negative aspects in this manner one comes to positive conclusions as follows:

Since no matter what methods or address are used, the Soviet being in the Eastern Zone is to be contacted directly for a very short time only. One has to find a mediator, a go-between. This mediator can only be the

6
SECRET

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET

German population in the Eastern Zone, present everywhere Russians are. One has to use a system which makes it easy and safe for the Germans to bring that sort of propaganda to the Russians which speaks first to the Germans. This system should work on the principle that clandestine radio stations would create psychological preparedness prior to and anticipating a later distribution of printed propaganda. If a propaganda action directed at the Russians could speak neither in the name of the Americans nor in the name of the Germans, and since an anonymous address has no chance of success, the Russians themselves are a third possibility. Here, the Russian emigration is a fortuitous discovery. This emigration's mere existence could help such a propaganda action. Of course it would be unwise for many reasons to activate these emigrant organizations into a psychological warfare action since they are often at odds with one another and are generally penetrated by Soviet agents, but the confusing potential which this emigration represents to the Russians could be exploited. One could take a cue from the German-organized "Szolensk Committee" of 1942 (Reference is made to Agent Report, S/R Marburg, Subject: VLASSOV Liberation Movement, File III-M-2085, paragraph 4b (h), dated 3 August 1948), which, at that time, existed only in the imagination of the Germans. For a future propaganda action against the Eastern Zone one should fictively construct a Russian national, anti-bolshevistic committee which would speak in the name of Mother Russia to the Soviet occupation personnel. This committee should show a conciliatory tendency, the tendency of the people caring earnestly for the well-being of the Russians and should not deal with especially complicated issues at the beginning. Since the propaganda of such a committee, for the previously mentioned tactical and technical reasons, could only reach the Russian ear through the Germans and since it seems necessary to appeal to the Germans before reaching the Russians, this committee should be a "German-Russian" or a "Russo-German" Committee. Such a friction could be well braced and supported politically and psychologically. History could be quoted to prove that the Russians and the Germans always enjoyed good relations when they lived together in peace. Nobody could suspect the Americans as being the source of such an argument. One could say that the present policy causes unnecessary hate and bitterness and forces the Germans into the arms of the West. One could tell the Russians that the

7
SECRET

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET

German-Russian feuds of the past have been artificially constructed. And during the same broadcast one could say, in German, that the Russians are not as bad as they are shown to be in the bolshevik picture distortions. By such and other methods one could construct an easier ingress into the Russians through which the Eastern Germans could enter with their propaganda influence.

II. 10: Propaganda addressed to the German population with the object of increasing German resistance to Soviet intimidation and domination would require a synchronization of the propaganda directed at both Germans and Russians since a certain degree of harmony between the two is desired. It would perhaps be wrong for political reasons and certainly wrong for tactical reasons to give this propaganda a too-accentuated anti-Soviet character, not to speak of appeals for resistance against the Soviet Occupation Power at this stage of affairs.

II. 10.1: German resistance against the occupation power in the Eastern Zone is as stiff as it can be at this phase without endangering life and such liberty as the Germans have. More resistance would require military backing which is impossible within the forms of a cold war. Therefore, increased resistance could not be secured and it would be irresponsible to attempt it. One should ask what would be the consequence of western-incited sabotage acts. The beneficial effects accruing to the West would be speedily counterbalanced in a very short time by wholesale liquidations of still-existing activists in the Eastern Zone. These forces could mean more operational capital at a later date.

II. 10.2: The aims of the propagandas intended for both Russian and German consumption are "to bring sand into the machinery" of the Soviet power. At the moment one could not do more to harass and encumber the Soviets than to begin to construct a confidential atmosphere between Russians and Germans on a non-Bolshevistic base. The German who hopes for a non-Soviet Russia and the Russian who is to be appealed to via the Germans and who can be liberated from his conqueror's isolation are already lost and useless from the viewpoint of the Soviet concepts. Since these two are considered useless to the Soviets their possible usefulness to the West is suspected. The Russians would be able to counteract organizationally incomprehensible infiltration by the speedy shifting of personnel and more severe restrictions. They will automatically be forced into the use of methods which will increase the general atmosphere of disaffection among their own troops. Since they have no starting points for active countermeasures, one can dictate the form of the action which they will be forced into. In their attempts to requite, retaliate and create organizational antibodies they will reveal their weak points. One cannot expect more from a psychological warfare action in a cold war.

8

SECRET

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET

II.16.21 Coabitation and synchronization of "German" and "Russian" propaganda is the main pillar of this plan. As a tactic, the German-Russian Committee has to picture the non-bolshevistic Russian as the friend of the Germans. The propaganda should advise the Germans not to see every Russian as a bolshevistic enemy even if the Russian is forced to act like one. It should impress Germans with the importance of making the non-bolshevistic voice hearable to the Russian. Possibilities of making the German effective in the role of mediator without endangering him will be spoken about later on.

II.16.11 In addition to the primary task of bringing propaganda to the Russian address, the propaganda addressed to the Germans can perform a second mission. Simultaneously with the bringing of the truth about Russia to the Russians, the German-Russian Committee can unmask the Soviet system. In unmasking this system the Germans should be told that it is erroneous to believe that one can combat Soviet methods with European methods. One should advise them to behave in front of the SED, the Soviet machine, as opponents to the government's party behave in a democracy and hollow out the SED from the inside. They should be instructed not to expose themselves to force and reprisal actions, to enter the SED and take part in its organizational activities. They should not attempt to handle a hypocritical situation with sincerity. Convincing the population of the Eastern Zone that they should use hypocrisy in dealing with the SED is the correct way to paralyze the SED's functions from within. This sort of propaganda would broadcast the seeds of mistrust between the Soviet leadership and the SED on one hand and between the false and genuine cooperators on the other. The resulting harm to the Soviet apparatus would be greater than the harm coming from direct actions. In every appraisal of the Soviet system one always returns to one fact and this fact is that Soviet practice, built upon the "eternal truth" of Marxism and Leninism, always and everywhere works after the scheme of thesis and antithesis. Instead of attempting to counter the Soviet system with identical means one should exploit their inabilities at feeling their way into the psyche of other peoples. One should appeal to the Machiavelli hidden in almost every German. The propaganda actions can Russian advisers, of all people, could most accurately indicate the manner in which other Russians should be handled.

II.16.2 What sort of an operational implement should be used? The answer to this question, in spite of all that has been said up until now, must begin with the fact that no complicated, expensive and always endangered distribution apparatus for printed propaganda exists. One could not expect to use secret radio transmission stations in the Eastern Zone. In such a thickly populated country this attempt would not have the slightest chance of success. In the Western sectors of BERLIN, too, transmission stations could be easily detected which would probably lead to diplomatic complications. So the choice of the technical means must begin from these aforementioned facts. As long as the war remains a cold

SECRET

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

one the technical means of a psychological warfare action must remain restricted to the use of radio and the printed word. Poison-pen letters and the spreading of rumors must, likewise, work with the same restrictions. Radio transmissions from the border areas of the U.S. Zone would have to be made in such a way that the positions of the stations cannot be determined either by direction finding technique from the Eastern Zone or by local Soviet agent activities. The enemy would have an excellent counter propaganda point if he could say with truth that the sending station is located in BRECKENRIDGE and that the Americans allow it to continue un molested. The clandestine character of a broadcasting station would have to be impregnable from all directions. To preserve this secrecy one needs at least three movable stations, if possible, more. The main station (station "A"), in addition to its technical personnel, should be staffed with the actions direction personnel, though it is not necessary that this direction personnel be physically present at station "A" at all times. The complete transmissions could be prepared at any place in any studio by transcriptions onto steel bands. These bands bearing the whole program to be broadcast could be forwarded to the regularly changing position of station "A" and the small staff at station "A" would be responsible only for the technical tasks relating to the transmission. These technical tasks could be assigned to one hundred percent American personnel and the control and censorship could, from the very origin of the transmissions, be under the strictest supervision. If it should be intended to use other than American personnel, it is possible to secure the services of qualified experts who, during the war, proved themselves capable at similar operations. The transmissions from station "A" could be received by stations "B" and "C" using the "Ball system" (receive and transmit) and transmit on a wave length synchronized to that station "A". In this manner reception in the Eastern Zone would be improved and the difficulties of establishing the origin point by the use of direction-finding technique would be aggravated since the same wave length would always appear to be coming from three (or more) directions. The enemy would have to work with a large number of movable direction finders and before he could fix his objective the stations would have already moved to different places. This changing of the stations' positions should be made every three or four days but with self-contained units changing of positions would be a minor technical difficulty. Stations "B" and "C" would, like station "A", require very few technical personnel.

II.1b: Since no distribution apparatus for printed propaganda in the Eastern Zone exists and since, from this quarter, it is considered inadvisable to construct one at this time, one should develop a system which can bring this material to the German population without the help of specific persons. Since, from here, it is not known whether Western aircraft operates over the Eastern Zone, the use of aircraft will, in this report, not be discussed. Artillery and rocket throwers, which were used with success in the war, shall also remain out of discussion. In Germany the westerly and easterly wind directions predominate. Balloons could be made of widely differing capacities which could transport printed

SECRET

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET

material over several hundred miles with favorable weather conditions. In the last war these balloons were equipped with a relatively simple time-fuse which allowed the cargo's complete or portionate release. After releasing its cargo the balloon would vanish by a self-destruction mechanism. As additional cover for the balloons' origin, they could be constructed after the model used by the Russian air force in collecting weather data. These balloons could start from the border areas. Since the necessary dispersal and release apparatus is small, it is readily transportable and the balloons could be released occasionally from other Western Zones. One could even outfit fisherboats and release the balloons under favorable weather conditions from the Baltic Sea. Kite balloons were also used with some success. They can reach a high altitude, carry a considerable load and can be made to disperse widely. Those areas of population concentration lying just behind the zonal borders toward which balloons could not be accurately aimed could be reached by missiles projected from simple and noiseless spring or pneumatic projectors; the leaflets, after reaching the desired point on their arc of flight could be released from an unsuspecting-looking paper container. Such an implement could be put to good use in BERLIN. Out of the existing conditions in BERLIN one could develop similar and better devices. For instance, the railways, subways and busses crossing the sector borders could be excellent propaganda material transporters. One could leave small parcels behind in these conveyances. The finders would, in many cases, carry them home and a large percentage of the leaflets would be put into circulation. All technical means for leaflet distribution mentioned here are primitive. Out of the necessity one can extract a virtue. It would appear to the Russians and even to the Germans that even if the Americans should do something like that they would not use such primitive means. This primitivity would imply the actual existence of some sort of an underground movement, thereby adding credence to the already claimed existence of German-Russian Committee operations in the Eastern Zone. They would assume that any underground movement in the Eastern Zone would have some contact with the outer world, might have some sort of a foreign finance source and that the movement might enjoy a certain tolerance. But it would be hardly possible to make an official American label adhere to the propaganda regardless of the surmises made regarding its origin. Even the radio transmissions should not automatically produce the impression of American origin. Apparent improvisation and extemporaneity could leave an impression of their unofficial character.

II.1b: One who considers the distribution of printed propaganda in the Eastern Zone as being a technical and organizational problem only will consider the foregoing suggestions insufficient for reasons as follows:

It is impossible to precisely fix and determine the material's landing point in advance except in the case of material aimed at parts of BERLIN and at cities near the zonal border.

SECRET

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET

It is impossible to hit specific towns and villages since they are such small points in the space of the landscape.

It is impossible to restrict and control the circle of finders and receivers of printed propaganda materials by using the methods proposed by this quarter.

Eastern Zone conditions that either exist or which could be constructed or animated by the clandestine radio's transmissions to assist the distribution effect are as follows:

Because of the balloons' limited carrying capacities, the leaflets, by necessity, would have to be small and light. This would not prevent their form and style from being impressive. Even though small and light they could be made in a manner that would cause them to be picked up and looked at with curiosity. Examples of this could be:

- (a) leaflets printed to look like Deutsche Mark or ruble notes on one side.
- (b) leaflets of the size and shape of cigarette papers, alternating one propaganda-bearing paper with one genuine cigarette paper in the package. These cigarette papers are very scarce in the Eastern Zone.
- (c) leaflets with political comic strips, numbered, "to be continued", with well-made political humor, Hennecke jokes, etc.

There is no limit to such fantasy. An important fact to be considered in the distribution of printed propaganda material is that the Eastern Zone population is psychologically prepared for the picking-up, reading and passing-on of leaflets. The population is in opposition to the Soviets and the SED, and hunger for such material is great. By no means smaller is the longing to harass the enemy. Actually, except in the cases of BERLIN and those points near the border at which the material can be accurately aimed, the materials will not go down in the towns and villages. In a country where there are at least one hundred and fifty persons living on each square kilometer and where the fields, woods, and gardens are, at least during the warm months, intensely traversed, one can expect that out of one hundred leaflets, twenty to thirty will be found very soon. Out of this twenty to thirty, fifteen to twenty-five will be passed on and produce the wanted effect. The leaflets which are addressed to the German population alone will quickly produce the wanted effect. They will pass from hand to hand and they will always have a certain rarity value which would make them longed for. Any expert knows how fast such literature circulates under such conditions. From the point in time at which

SECRET

12

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

they are picked up onward, their distribution is no longer a technical and organizational problem. From this point onward their speed and range of circulation depends upon their form and content. The clandestine radio stations could, from time to time, announce the appearance of a new leaflet thereby creating a certain tension and curiosity. A certain portion of the leaflets should be prepared for the Soviet reader. The whole theme song of the clandestine radio stations, before the beginning of the leaflet distribution, should be tuned to German-Russian friendship. Before distributing the leaflets the German finder should be conditioned to assist the Soviet out of his isolation. After a certain period, during which the German would be conditioned by the radio transmissions, leaflets which could be divided in half along a perforation, one half intended for the German and the other half intended for the Russian, should be distributed. The leaflet, on the half printed in German, should advise the German finder how to introduce the Russian-printed half into the surroundings of the Russians without endangering himself. He could be advised to lose it on the street, in a bar, on the floor of an official building, in a public conveyance or any place which is used by the Russians. At the beginning of such a propaganda distribution one could play a productive prank by printing one parenthetical sentence in German on a leaflet otherwise printed in Russian advising the German finder that the leaflet is forbidden and that it is his duty, after the occupation power's regulations, to hand it immediately over to the first member of the occupation force whom he can contact.

II. Id. (2) and (3)(4): The Russian, the primitive, feels a child-like enjoyment when contemplating a rare and extraordinary object. His whole lifetime long he has been fed with gray and monotonous leaflets. He would pick up and hide well-executed leaflets not only because of their content but also because of their curious form. A leaflet appearing to be a ruble note while lying on the ground, an *Izvestia* in micro form, a genuine book the size of a postage stamp he would never throw away. He would hide it because of its rarity and show it with childish pride to his friends. Later one could proceed with falsified documents, formulas and such things. Actually success would not depend upon general and wide distribution of this material. The mere existence of such a propaganda action would force the Soviet administration and troop command into counter-actions which would always be sources of embarrassment to subordinates. A relatively small quantity of such material would suffice to release the mistrust of everyone against everybody. Even those leaflets which reach the control authorities through visible and controlled ways would lead those authorities to believe that a far larger number of such leaflets circulate through clandestine channels. The

SECRET

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

clandestine radio transmissions should continually refer to given leaflets and underline or interpret their significance. The transmissions should also create the impression that there are vast numbers of leaflets circulating in the Eastern Zone. If this impression could be created, then the smaller the amounts of the leaflets that the control authorities succeeded in seizing the more they would be inclined to believe that large numbers remain successfully hidden.

II.11: During wartime there were some astonishingly successful results achieved by using slanderous and compromising information against high-ranking military authorities. One typical and very impressive example I witnessed myself. In this sphere the Soviets are very sensitive. One should always be on the alert for such possibilities to discredit and embarrass them and the radio and printed word should be fully exploited in this direction. Of many methods possible, one which requires the use of one carefully selected agent is outlined as follows:

The radio transmissions should always shriek in German that the crimes of the Soviets and SED functionaries stink to heaven and request hearers who know of specific cases of graft and corruption to communicate them by unsigned letters, faking or omitting the return address, to MERLIN acquaintances and to request these acquaintances to forward the letters to the West MERLIN Postoffice, Box Number 172. One could gather a sufficiently large number of letters by this method. It is hardly to be expected that the Soviets could forbid postal deliveries to Western MERLIN without losing face. Of course the Soviets would attempt to surveil the person who rented or visited the postbox but if the box renter observed security precautions he would certainly not be endangered as much as he would be if he had to enter the Eastern Zone to gather such material as came to the box. Perhaps by the use of this or a similar method one could construct a system to gauge the success and failure of the propaganda action and thus build a bridge between the German-Russian Committee and its hearers. To gather material for use in attacking military reputations and in undermining officer and troop morale the propaganda editors should be able to interrogate Russian deserters. Without doubt such interrogations follow military themes and the results of such themes provide scant material for use against propaganda targets. The propaganda action's agent should have access to the deserters also. If this is impossible, then the usual interrogation should be supplemented by a special and detailed questionnaire. However, such a questionnaire would be an unsubstantial substitute. The deserter should be questioned about his personal sorrows and quarrels, about those insufficiencies, injustices and corruptions which trouble him personally. The simple soldier and especially the Russian soldier is much more affected by petty grievances than by high level and intellectual problems. One should learn whether he gets his pay on time, whether he gets his rations, liquor and

~~SECRET~~ SECRET

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

clothing punctually and of the correct quality and quantity. One should learn who makes a good deal out of the vodka he should but does not get, and who may commit crimes without punishment. One should learn about his immediate surroundings, the names and idiosyncrasies of those superiors who trouble or oppress him. By learning these things one could gather the material with which to appeal to the simple Soviet people in a manner that would trouble their superiors. The propaganda should be able to relate the manner in which the deserter crossed the Frontier, how well and happy he is at present and how decently he was received by his non-Soviet brethren. By these methods one could induce new desertions and thus always provide himself with new and provable authority. Access in a direct, or in at least a round-about way is a presupposition without which the whole scheme is impracticable. If the propaganda action should develop to importance and if it should be commissioned with large and specified tasks it might be necessary for the action to use a small network of agents in the Eastern Zone. This network should be used to collect specific information relative to gauging the propaganda's success and failure. The discussed plan does not foresee the organization of an agent distribution apparatus in the Eastern Zone and the gathering of such gauging information could be managed by a perhaps already existing organization of agents working on a similar line. This perhaps already existing network would be spared the organizational and technical burdens with which an Agent distribution apparatus would be loaded. Or, one could entrust this information gathering task to some already existing Russian or German communication channel. Contacts with such groups from this quarter do not exist. Conditionally enforced isolation has almost completely prevented my contacting anyone active in German affairs. Making such contacts would require latitude and security of movement for rather extensive but tolerable journeys. After finishing these journeys it would be possible to forward a general organization chart and plan for agent operation. I would estimate that these journeys would require six weeks. As long as it is possible to carry on a psychological warfare campaign without having direct contact with an agent network of any kind in the Eastern Zone one should not unnecessarily burn one's fingers. Since the United States would hardly have the intention of exposing itself as the manager of a psychological warfare campaign against targets in the Eastern Zone, such agents, if they are not already contracted, would have to be approached by a "private group". The psychological warfare campaign would have to deal with paid agents and the paid agents' dependability would be influenced by the "private group's" power to guarantee the agents' futures and the security of their families. The possibility of engaging politically trustworthy men on an ideological

SECRET

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

basis does not exist. One asks, "To what and to whom should they be obligated?" Since America, the representative of western power politics, cannot appear in the open, the only possibility remaining with which to entice ideological idealists is the promise to assist the organization of a national German group whose object would be the liberation of the Eastern Zone. Such a group would have to have its specific gravity point in the U.S. Zone. It is hardly to be expected that such a group would be tolerated by American authorities. When one appeals to the ideology of a confidential cooperator in order to expose him to heavy dangers one cannot work with a fiction as the suggested German-Russian Committee. To present an enticement, a national German group would actually have to exist and nobody could limit the activity of such a group toward one specific objective without spoiling its normal attractiveness.

II.1j: As for myself I am prepared and willing to assist a psychological warfare campaign against the mentioned targets within the general framework of this plan. I believe, too, that I could arrange the cooperation of needed specialists. The basic presupposition for such a cooperation is a conduit of command that would permit the passage of orders from above and the account of actions from below in a completely faithful and undistorted manner. The orders, after this presupposition, would have to come from and the obligations would have to be made to an American authority of sufficiently high rank and status as to be able to secure the non-American personnel against the actions of both American and German authorities by lawful measures. In order to prevent all collaborators from being exposed at some future date to prosecution and punishment for disseminating forbidden propaganda or for engaging in subversive activities, the propaganda unit should be incorporated into some large American army framework or into some equally powerful organ of the U.S. Government. A propaganda action against targets in the Eastern Zone conducted in such a manner as to confuse impressions of American sponsorship could not be successful without recourse to such a power to seal, cover and protect the non-Americans therein cooperating. This cooperation would extend into spheres as follows:

Transmission stations, even clandestine and movable, cannot be operated and moved in a manner precluding German police restraint unless they are mounted on U.S. Army-marked vehicles with U.S. Army personnel therein. Since these movable stations would need to serve only limited technical functions, the stations could be operated by completely American personnel. In case the American technicians are not available at the outset of the operation, German technicians could be found who could later be relieved to serve in other capacities.

The production of printed materials requires a specialized and exclusive plant. Micro-printing and printing on rice paper requires peculiar-looking tools. Russian type cyphers and those of the many

SECRET

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET

Russian dialects could not be handled in an open printing shop. A very special printing plant would have to be imported or requisitioned. Its operation would require the use of sworn personnel and complete impregnability to German authorities. Of course, only American command could arrange these countless and delicate details.

The editorial staff originating the printed propaganda and the radio transmission would, by necessity, be composed of American and non-American elements and mutual concessions would sometimes be required in order to produce the end product which would be subject to American censorship. The American sponsors would be expected to use their censorship very strictly. It is reasonable and understandable that non-American cooperators would meet a certain distrust from the American side. The non-American cooperator, however, will feel a mistrust, in the beginning, at least, for the Americans. The non-American cooperator would expect that heavy responsibility and wide latitude of action would indicate a preparation on the part of the American to disavow his cooperator in event that large interests could be served by the disavowal. The heaviness of the responsibility and the measure of the non-American's permitted action-latitude would appear to the non-American as indicative of the proportional speed and vehemence with which his cooperation would be denied. Therefore, to reach an atmosphere which would exclude this mutual mistrust it is suggested that personal intimacy between members of the editorial staff be encouraged. This intimacy would benefit the campaign in other ways besides closing the atmosphere against mistrust. The non-Americans should transfer their experiences, their knowledge and their abilities in an unrepressed manner, but their field of activity should be halted at clearly definable lines. The one who exercises censorship bears the responsibility. Only under such conditions can one secure the maxima of exploitable self-expression.

III.K: The period needed for the preparation of such an operation does not depend upon the solution of the personnel, but upon the solution of the technical and organizational problems. The staff of German cooperators including editors, studio people, translators, the radio speaker for the German and Russian languages, radio transmission-technicians, experts for balloons and kites, could be found under favorable and reasonable conditions in a few weeks. But as has been said before, the whole technical part of the operation could be accomplished with purely American personnel. The period for the technical preparation cannot be estimated from this quarter. It is not known whether the necessary technical equipment is immediately available, whether the equipment of the German propaganda troops is still existing and usable. Among this equipment were complicated Russian dialect characters such as would be vitally needed. If these characters have to be produced in Europe, perhaps the makers who produced the best materials could be traced. For instance, the best European-made movable radio transmission

SECRET

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET

stations (one thousand watt) were produced in a northern Italian factory. Since such details are unknown at present, prediction of the time needed for preparation is impossible.

4. AGENT'S NOTES:

a. Background Information:

See paragraph 2.

b. Clarifying Comments:

The EEs in the referenced letter divulge the intended direction, however, they do not, and of course cannot, divulge the agency's organizational character or limitations. The undersigned Agent's ignorance of these organizational aspects limits the scope of conversations dealing with organizational questions. Therefore, the answers to organizational EEs must feel the terrain speculatively and, in most cases, must hang in the air. SUBJECT claims that concrete organizational proposals can be made only after learning whether or not the propaganda action is to be given a "private enterprise" character. The belief is held by the undersigned Agent that such problems cannot be comprehensively dealt with in anonymous transmissions. Since the EEs given can be only thinly disguised before a man of SUBJECT's intelligence and probing curiosity, it is assumed that the EEs imply a certain already-existing trust. If this assumption should be correct and if appraisal of this report should indicate further contact with SUBJECT regarding propaganda matters desirable, then it is believed that the next step should be a personal discussion between SUBJECT and those experts who have crystallized ideas concerning the extent of their means and purposes. In event that SUBJECT's further use is planned, the Agency should take immediate, visibly positive procedures toward his activation and toward instrumentation of his Spruchkammer immunity.

c. Agent's Opinion:

Daily association with SUBJECT indicate that he would be a negligible security risk when dealing with Communistic questions. However, his mental preparedness to further German national interests along the lines of the Nazi ideology is not doubted.

SECRET

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

~~SECRET~~

d. Evaluations: B-2, excluding those parts which are opinion and that opinion can only be evaluated by the agency experienced in handling such planned matters.

APPROVED:

/s/ Albert L. Wroblecki
ALBERT L. WROBLECKI
Special Agent, CIG
Operations Officer

Telephone: Bad Wildungen 422/PENNERKILL/anh

Distribution:
6 - 7970th CIG, HUCOM (Mr. HUGHES)
1 - File

~~SECRET~~

BEST AVAILABLE COPY